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A CONFUCIAN VERSION OF HYBRID REGIME: HOW DOES




There are four problems with democracy, especially the institu-
tion of one person one vote.  Many democratic and liberal thinkers under-
stand them and try to correct them from within.  But I will argue that
these revisions are fundamentally inadequate to address these problems.
A better political arrangement to deal with this fact than today’s democ-
racies is a hybrid regime that contains both democratic and meritocratic
elements, which is what a Confucian would propose.  I will illustrate the
basic arrangements of this regime, and show why it can deal with the
aforementioned fact and so why it is superior to today’s democratic re-
gimes.
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1. Four problems with democracy
The majority of people all over the world may still believe that
liberal democracy is the best possible regime, the “end of history”, as
Francis Fukuyama’s famous book’s title suggests (1992).  When facing
with challenges that show problems with democracies, the more informed
tend to appeal to the famous retort allegedly made by Winston Churchill:
“Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other
forms that have been tried from time to time”.2 Clever as it seems, this
claim may be a sign of our intellectual laziness, because it lacks empirical
and theoretical support.  Empirically, in controlling corruption, making
sound long-term economic policies, decreasing ethnic violence, and choos-
ing leaders that are competent and represent the true will of the people,
democracies, especially in the developing world, don’t always or clearly
do better than non-democracies.3
Theoretically, democracy, with regard to its institution of one per-
son one vote, also leads to many problems.  First, the mainstream ideol-
ogy beneath one person one vote is the belief in the power of the people,
and, by implication, the suspicion of the power of the elite and even the
power of the government.  For example, the anti-government and anti-
intellectualist attitude is a reason for many peculiar American phenom-
ena.  These phenomena include, first, a critical factor of “electability” of
a candidate is whether he or she is likable, is one of us, and is someone
that can come to visit us in our living rooms.  In the 2004 presidential
campaign, a “masterpiece” by the Bush team is to label successfully John
Kerry as a member of the East Coast elite.  Those who support Bush
believe in this propaganda, while those who are against him are con-
vinced that Bush is a redneck, like so many of his supporters.  However,
the matter of the fact is that the Bush family also came from the East
Coast, and his family is actually far more established than Kerry’s.  Bush
and Kerry both went to Yale and attended the same secret club.  More-
over, what many Americans don’t know is that Bush had higher GPA’s
than Kerry in college.  The cover-up of Bush’s background and the attack
on Kerry may have been a result of the campaign culture that is rooted in
one person one vote.  Second, American politicians often claim to be an
outsider of the government in order to get elected into the government,
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and that their role in the government is to get rid of it.  When a ruling
branch of a government consists of ‘simple folks’ who despise govern-
ment (i.e., themselves), it is hard to imagine this branch will turn out to be
respected, even by the people who put them there.  This is probably why
the US Congress __ in principle, the most representative of
political institutions __ scores at the bottom of most sur-
veys asking Americans which institutions they most re-
spect whereas the Supreme Court, the armed forces, and
the Federal Reserve System (all appointed rather than
elected bodies) score highest.  (Zakaria 2003, 248)
Daniel Bell quotes this passage and uses it to support his Confu-
cian model that is partly based upon the rule of the wise and virtuous and
demands respect for government (Bell 2006, 289, note 34).
Second, the institution of one person one vote lacks effective
mechanisms to take into account the interest of non-voters, including
future (and past) generations and foreigners.  Thus, democracy may have
difficulties in dealing with issues of budget deficit (i.e., spending future
generations’ money for the present voters), environmental issues that are
related to spending the resources of future generations, and foreign aid or
other issues involving the interests of foreigners.  For example, an inter-
esting phenomenon in the U.S. is that, those interest groups that are con-
cerned with the interests of domestic workers, such as unions and Demo-
crats that are supported by these unions, often favor protectionist poli-
cies that hurt the interests of poor workers in other countries.
Third, and related to the second issue, even among the present
living adults of a state, the interest of the vocal and powerful tends to
trump the interest of the silent (or silenced) and the powerless.  This may
be a reason for the ethnical problems in democracies, especially the newly
democratized ones (that haven’t yet developed fully-functioned rule of
law and the protection of liberties).
Fourth, even with regard to their own interests, it is questionable
whether voters alone can be the best judges of them.  As many political
observers-from both a more popular and anecdotal perspective and a more
scholarly perspective-have pointed out, the appalling political ignorance
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of the (American) general public is a well-established fact over “the six
decades of modern public opinion research” (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004,
34).4
As an example, let me discuss a particular symptom that may have
been caused by the above problems, the issue of foreign policy.  Foreign
policy often needs expertise, patient and often painful dialogues, and long-
term planning.  But in a popular democracy such as the U.S., as Henry
Kissinger argues, foreign policy is often driven by the public mood, and
this mood is in turn swayed by what is on TV, but not determined by what
is important in international affairs.  Another influence on foreign policies
is domestic politics that has nothing to do with diplomacy.  This is be-
cause, oftentimes, a congressperson or an official who is in favor of a
foreign policy has to promise to support a domestic item to get the sup-
port of another congressperson or another official.  These factors are
obviously in conflict with the needs of good diplomatic policies (Kissinger
2001, 77).
2. “Internal” solutions to these problems and their fundamental limit
Many liberal and democratic thinkers also realize the aforemen-
tioned problems with democracy, especially the institution of one person
one vote, and have offered various answers to these problems.  On the
first problem, an obvious answer is call for a proper respect for reason
and government.  The respect for reason (and those with reason) doesn’t
necessarily mean the negation of equality.  People can still be equal in
many ways, because equality is a rather broad concept.  Government
should be understood as a necessary good, and not as a necessary evil or
even an unnecessary evil.  Popular elections can be understood as select-
ing the most competent and worthy, and not as the punishment of the
bad.5  These revisions can be endorsed by some liberal and democratic
thinkers, without contradicting their fundamental tenets.
A cause of the first three problems is an immoral and radical ver-
sion of individualism that is taken by some as the sacred ideology of de-
mocracy.  According to this individualism, we are and should be free and
equal individuals who care nothing but our self-interests (“self” under-
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stood as an atom- or monad-like individual).  We concede part of our
freedom to be under a government because we would be better off than
we would be in the natural state of affairs, where our interests are in
constant jeopardy from other selfish individuals-hence the government is
considered a necessary evil, or because we are deceived to think so-hence
the government is considered an unnecessary evil.  Other than the regula-
tions by the government which are considered necessary in this tradeoff,
we should assert our self-interests as much as we like.  As mentioned,
“self” here is understood as an atom- or monad-like individual, and thus
self-interests are narrowly defined.  The interests of our ancestors or de-
scendants (especially those who are present) are not a part of these self-
interests, nor are the interests of foreigners.  To say that self-interests are
narrowly defined doesn’t mean that they only include immediate material
interests.  They can also include articles of faith taken sacred by the indi-
vidual.  As a result, for example, there are so-called “issue-voters” in
American democracy.  They vote based upon their pre-determined ar-
ticles of faith (on abortion, gun rights, etc.), not allowing it to be open to
just and fair discussion with others.  Democracy then degenerates into a
form of peaceful form of battle of might (which side has more issue vot-
ers that can push their legislature through).
Perhaps seeing that this selfish and radical version of individual-
ism as a cause of the first three problems of democracy, the late American
political philosopher John Rawls, for example, challenges the view one
person one vote is nothing but counting heads, and argues that, for voting
to be justifiable, the voting entity has to consider the common good or
the interests of other entities, rather than merely its own narrowly defined
private interests.  We can see this from the concept of “reasonable”, as
well as the related concepts of public reason and reciprocity, that are
crucial to his understanding of liberal democracy in his later philosophy.
On the concept of “reasonable”, Rawls writes,
Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as
free and equal in a system of social cooperation over gen-
erations, they are prepared to offer one another fair terms
of social cooperation … and they agree to act on those
terms, even at the cost of their own interests in particular
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situations, provided that others also accept those terms.
(Rawls 1996, xliv)6
On the contrary, if one votes purely based upon one’s comprehen-
sive doctrine, and accepts the failure of pushing through his or her agenda
by the majority of votes only as a convenient truce waiting to be broken
by any means possible, for Rawls, the stability so achieved is a “modus
vivendi” and is not stability for the right reasons.7  In short, according to
Rawls, liberal democracy requires that each voter vote not merely on
private interests, including both material and doctrinal, but on a concep-
tion of common good.
But how to achieve this?  How to make people moral as required
by Rawls and by our need to address the first three problems of democ-
racy?  To achieve this “civil friendship” (Rawls 1999a, 137), Rawls ap-
peals to education and habituation (“moral learning”) that are conducted
through social and political institutions arranged by liberal democracy
(ibid., 15 and 44-45), through families (ibid., 157), and through interna-
tional and domestic political and cultural environments (ibid., 27 (note
23), 102-103, and 112-113). He also pins his hope on the role of states-
men (ibid., 97-103 and 112).
The question, then, is whether these corrections will be effective.
The qualification of equality among individuals that is necessary to make
way for the respect for the competent and the public-minded and for
government is not explicitly discussed by Rawls, and thus the first prob-
lem that is partly caused by the selfish and radical version of individualism
is still undressed.  As for the second and the third problems, if the “rea-
sonable” people cannot form a majority of a democracy, under the present
arrangement of one person one vote, non-voters’ interests can hardly be
considered adequately.  Unfortunately, it seems that we cannot realisti-
cally expect the reasonable people to form a majority.  In fact, Rawls
himself offers an argument for this impossibility under the institution of
one person one vote, which he contributes to the Hegelians and never
answers.  He writes,
whereas, so the [Hegelian] view goes, in a liberal society,
where each citizen has one vote, citizens’ interests tend to
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shrink and center on their private economic concerns to
the detriment of the bonds of community, in a consulta-
tion hierarchy, when their group is so represented, the
voting members of the various groups take into account
the broader interests of political life. (Rawls 1999a, 73)
Of course, whether the majority of reasonable people can be formed
is open to theoretical and empirical studies.  But there is yet another-I
consider most fatal-problem with democracy, that is, the fourth problem
with democracy previously mentioned.  Again, liberal and democratic
thinkers such as Rawls see this problem.  He also thinks that, in a real-
rather than formal-liberal democracy, citizens have to be informed.  To
achieve this, it is crucial that their basic needs be satisfied and they enjoy
education, as well as means necessary to get informed.  For example,
Rawls points out, “Hegel, Marxist, and socialist writers have been quite
correct in making the objection” that “liberties taken alone” are “purely
formal”.
By themselves they are an impoverished form of liber-
alism, indeed not liberalism at all but libertarianism (VII:3).
The latter does not combine liberty and equality in the
way liberalism does; it lacks the criterion of reciprocity
and allows excessive social economic inequalities as judged
by that criterion.  (Rawls 1996, lviii; also see Rawls 1999a,
49-50)
To ensure a plural liberal democracy that is stable for the right
reasons, Rawls proposes the following institutions: “a. Public financing
of elections and ways of assuring the availability of public information on
matters of policy”; “b. A certain fair equality of opportunity, especially in
education and training”; “c. A decent distribution of income and wealth
meeting the third condition of liberalism: all citizens must be assured the
all-purpose means necessary for them to take intelligent and effective
advantage of their basic freedoms”; “d. Society as employer of last re-
sort…” so that citizens can have a sense of long-term security and the
opportunity of meaningful work and occupation that are crucial to their
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self-respect and their sense of being a member of society; “e. Basic health
care assured all citizens” (Rawls 1996, lviii-lix).  According to Rawls,
failing to establish these institutions will lead to the sorry state of (Ameri-
can?) political reality.  He writes,
When politicians are beholden to their constituents for
essential campaign funds, and a very unequal distribution
of income and wealth obtains in the background culture,
with the great wealth being in the control of corporate
economic power, is it any wonder that congressional leg-
islation is, in effect, written by lobbyists, and Congress
becomes a bargaining chamber in which laws are bought
and sold? (Rawls 1999a, 24, f19).
It should become clear that, for Rawls, the desirable form of lib-
eral democracy is a kind of deliberative democracy.  In The Law of Peoples,
he explicitly expresses this idea: “Here I am concerned only with a well-
ordered constitutional democracy … understood also as a deliberative
democracy” (Rawls 1999a, 138).  Deliberative democracy
recognizes that without wide-spread education in the ba-
sic aspects of constitutional democratic government for
all citizens, and without a public informed about pressing
problems, crucial political and social decisions simply can-
not be made.  Even should farsighted political leaders wish
to make sound changes and reforms, they cannot convince
a misinformed and cynical public to accept and follow them.
(Rawls 1999a, 139-140)
In addition the arrangements that eliminate damaging social and
economic inequality, clearly, freedom of speech and information and other
liberties are also necessary for people to get informed.  As Rawls points
out, measures such as public financing of elections need to be taken to
assure that public information on matters of policy is not distorted by the
influence of money, and, in general, to assure the availability of public
information, in addition to the formal protection of relevant liberties.
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Moreover, the public has to be given an opportunity to digest information
available.  Otherwise, the availability of information will again become
merely formal.  For example, political scientists Bruce Ackerman and
James Fishkin propose that there should be a new national holiday, the
Deliberation Day, when “registered voters would be called together in
neighborhood meeting places … to discuss the central issues raised by
the campaign.  Each deliberator would be paid $150 for the day’s work of
citizenship…” (Ackerman and Fishkin 2004, 34).  Clearly, the days when
voters cast their votes should also be national or state holidays.
However, I will argue in the following that these measures-al-
ready drastic and radical against the political reality of today’s democra-
cies-are still not adequate.  These liberal thinkers have a vision of liberal
democracy that is at least in one aspect fundamentally republican.  That
is, in their ideal form of democracy, citizens need to be well-informed and
actively participatory and have a form of civil friendship (Rawls 1999a,
137), although the degree of participation in their democracy may not be
as extensive as it was in ancient republics such as ancient Rome and those
of ancient Athens.  Then, a look into the Athenian democracy might help
us to see why today’s (weaker) republican form of democracy is doomed
to fail.  First, the success of Athenian democracy was built upon slavery.
That is, it was the use of slave labors that freed Athenian citizens from
daily work and made it possible for them to fully participate in political
matters.  But even by using slaves, the adequacy of the political compe-
tence of Greek citizens was still challenged by classical writers such as
Plato and Aristophanes.  Then, how likely is it that the common people in
a modern democracy, who need to work hard to maintain their basic liv-
ing-this is a basic fact of capitalism and perhaps all modern societies that
rid themselves of the guilty leisure of slavery, can participate in politics to
the extent of acquiring the political competence necessary for a desirable
form of liberal and deliberative democracy?  It is true that, through mass
education, the modern society produces much more educated, white color
professionals, such as scientists, engineers, doctors, financiers, teachers,
and so on.  But what the education gives them is a special craft, and they
are consumed by their daily work so as to know little about public affairs
or anything outside of their narrow specializations.  As Jose? Ortega y
Gasset said, they are “learned ignorami” (Ortega 1932, 108-112).  In
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short, in today’s world, the majority of people are still consumed by their
daily work, and may have limited knowledge about public affairs or any-
thing outside of their narrow specializations.
To make the problem even more serious, we need to understand
that also crucial to the level of political participation in ancient Athens is
the fact that Athens was all small in size and in population, compared to
most of the contemporary democratic countries.  According to many po-
litical thinkers, on the issue of what kind of regime a state can adopt,
“size matters”.  Montesquieu offers one of the most powerful arguments
for this view.  According to him, it is necessary that a democracy be small.
No medium-sized or large country can really be a democracy.  The rea-
sons he offers are the following.
In a large republic [which including both democracy
and aristocracy], there are large fortunes, and consequently
little moderation in spirits: the depositories are too large
to put in the hands of a citizen; interests become particu-
larized; at first a man feels he can be happy, great, glori-
ous without his homeland; and soon, that he can be great
only on the ruins of his homeland.
In a large republic, the common good is sacrificed to a
thousand considerations; it is subordinated to exceptions;
it depends upon accidents.  In a small one, the public good
is better felt, better known, lies nearer to each citizen;
abuses are less extensive there and consequently less pro-
tected.  (Montesquieu 1989, 124)9
In short, for Montesquieu, a large republic leads to large fortunes.
This corrupts the virtue necessary to a democracy.  In particular, a person’s
interest becomes detached from, or even in opposition to, the common
good.  Moreover, the common good becomes too sophisticated for the
citizens of this state to grasp.
One may argue that, for Montesquieu, a large state can be demo-
cratic in the form of the federal republic (Montesquieu 1989, 131-132).
But what Montesquieu discusses is something similar to the federation of
ancient Greek states, a federation still far smaller than most of today’s
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democracies.  Also different from Montesquieu’s understanding, the cen-
tral government of today’s democracies is directly elected, and has far
greater power than what Montesquieu allows.
One may also argue that the kind of democracy Montesquieu dis-
cusses is not the same as the liberal democracy Rawls and others under-
stand.  This argument may be true, but this and the previous arguments
do not affect the force of Montesquieu’s challenge.  Put in today’s lan-
guage, we can challenge the likelihood for citizens to be informed in a
large state that does not allow the use of slave labors to free its citizens
from their daily works by offering the following arguments.  First, the
overwhelming material wealth in a large state may tempt people away
from the civil duty to be reasonable and informed citizens.  This require-
ment of citizens to be reasonable and informed is much more limited than
what Montesquieu considers the necessary virtue in a democracy
(Montesquieu 1989, 22-26), but it is still very demanding.  Second, cor-
porations, especially in the age of globalization, develop interest separate
from and even in conflict with the interest of their own states, be it demo-
cratic or otherwise.  Third, the common good in a large state is so com-
plex that it is beyond most people’s willingness or ability to comprehend,
and the majority is doomed to be uninformed, however intelligent and
well-educated and however willing to participate in political affairs each
citizen is.  Related to this point, in a small state, people might be ac-
quainted with political figures, whereas, in a large state, the majority of
the people cannot judge the quality of a politician through a long-term
and close contact with him or her, but can only do so by following all
kinds of propaganda, which makes their opinion of the politician easily
manipulatable.
In an article by the journalist Robert Kaplan, he offers many ex-
amples of failed democracies in the modern and contemporary periods.
His analysis of the reason for these failures is similar to Montesquieu’s
argument (Kaplan 1997), although he presents this kind of argument in
the context of modern and contemporary democracies.  The solution
Kaplan offers is a hybrid regime that combines the democratic elements
with paternalistic elements, which, as we will see, is similar to the limited
democracy that is suggested by Confucians.  In a recent article by the
political scientist Russell Hardin (2002), he discusses “three devastating
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theoretical claims” in postwar public choice theory, made by Kenneth
Arrow, Anthony Downs, as well as Mancur Olson, that are “against the
coherence of any democratic theory that is conceived as even minimally
participatory, collectively consistent, and well-informed” (2002, 212).
Hardin develops these claims “by relating them and, in particular, by sub-
jecting them to an economic theory of knowledge” (2002, 213).  Two
crucial arguments he makes in this paper are: first, each person’s vote
doesn’t really matter; second, to be informed is rather demanding, per-
haps much more so than we usually think.  If we put these two arguments
together, the implication is that, if they are rational, voters have, or they
should have, very little interest to vote, let alone getting informed.  The
first argument is partly a result of the fact that today’s democracies__even
on the scale of the state of New Hampshire that has about a quarter of a
million voters__are too large for one single vote to matter.  This is because
even if there is one vote difference after we count all the votes in a large
state, “merely for practical reasons of the impossibility of counting votes
accurately”, we still cannot say for certain which side wins, and other
means have to be used for us to make this judgment (Hardin 2002, 220).10
To understand this point, we only need to be reminded of the fact that,
during the Florida recount in the 2000 election, the matter had to be
resolved by the Supreme Court.  The second argument also has some-
thing to do with the fact of the size of today’s democracies, as their large
size makes the price of getting informed unbearably high.  Thus, we can
consider Hardin’s thesis as yet another contemporary development of
Montesquieu’s.  If all these thinkers are correct, then it is simply impos-
sible for the majority of voters to even come close to meet the pre-condi-
tions of a meaningful democratic participation.
On a more sympathetic note, all the previous problems aside, some
citizens may prefer other obligations and interests-such as family obliga-
tions or scientific or artistic pursuits__to a time__consuming involvement
in politics.  These citizens may choose to remain politically indifferent.
This choice becomes increasingly sensible when the political matters be-
come too complicated due to the size of the state and the fact that the
modern citizens don’t enjoy the guilty luxury of the ancient Greeks who
forced the slaves to do their daily chores.  Unlike the ancient republican
form of democracy, a contemporary liberal democracy should let these
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voluntarily non-participating citizens be.  However, there should also be
a mechanism that prevents the indifferent citizens from having too much
a voice in political matters.
In Political Liberalism, Rawls points out five facts of democratic
society, which lead to his consideration of the central problem: how a
plural yet stable liberal democracy is possible (1996, xxvii, 36-38 and 58;
also see 1989, 474-478).  We can then add an additional (sixth) fact of
modern democracy (or a group of facts).  First, human beings have a
tendency to fall back to their self-interest, which is encouraged by one
person one vote.  Second, some citizens choose to remain politically in-
different to many political matters.  Third, modern democratic states are
in general so large that it makes it impossible for the majority of the citi-
zenry to be adequately informed, however hard both the government and
the individuals try.  The causes of this impossibility are, first, due to the
size of the modern states and the noble rejection of slavery, to be in-
formed is a burden that most citizens’ intelligence, education, and will-
ingness cannot bear; second, the population of modern states renders a
single vote practically meaningless; third, the material wealth and the power
of big corporations run free and wild, and they destroy the motive of the
elite to devote themselves to the common good and distort information.
The sixth fact seems to suggest that the Rawlsian liberal and deliberative
democracy, or liberal and deliberative democracy in general, in which
every citizen participates in an equal manner and in the form of one per-
son one vote, is impossible in the modern world where each state is sim-
ply too large.
3. The hybrid regime of Confu-China and its superiority
Next, I will present a Confucian form of ideal government-I call it
“Confu-China”, which, as we will see, can address the four problems of
democracy better than the present democratic regimes with all their pos-
sible internal revisions.  I have argued elsewhere that this government is
what a Confucian would endorse and promote,11 and, given the focus of
this volume, I won’t repeat the arguments here.  I will offer a framework
of this government in the following.
First, the rule of law and human rights are endorsed and firmly
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established in Confu-China.  The possibility and necessity of this endorse-
ment have been discussed elsewhere.12
Second, in Confu-China, the government is considered to be re-
sponsible for the material and moral well-being of the people.  It is re-
sponsible for making it possible that average citizen has their basic mate-
rial, social or relationship, moral and political, and educational needs met.
On the issue of material needs, economic inequality is contained, follow-
ing Rawls’s own “Difference Principle” (Rawls 1971, 60-62 and 78-83).
On the issue of education, in addition to theoretical and technical knowl-
edge, the government is also responsible for offering citizens civic educa-
tion.  The goal of civic education is to make citizens understand the fol-
lowing: each citizen should have compassion for others and maintain
proper relationships to them; the role of the government is to maintain
the material and moral well-being of the people; the politicians in the
government should be those who are morally and intellectually
superior__morally superior in the sense that they are willing to extend
their compassion to all the people who are within his or her power to
help; if the politicians are indeed morally and intellectually superior, they
should be respected by the common people; the right to participate in a
certain political matter is inseparable from one’s willingness to consider
the common good and one’s competence at making sound decisions on
this matter.  To satisfy the moral and political needs of each citizen in-
cludes satisfying his or her need to participate in politics.  Then, in addi-
tion to offering the aforementioned education, if a citizen is interested in
and has potential of participating in politics, the government should offer
all means necessary__for example, the freedom of speech that makes it
possible for people to be informed, place and time (for example, “delib-
eration days”) necessary for political discussions and voting, etc.
As argued in the first and second sections of this paper, the gov-
ernment and the competent and virtuous that run the government should
be respected.  Some democratic thinkers may accept this, but this is built
into Confucianism, making Confu-China more firmly equipped with deal-
ing with the first problem with democracy.  A fact noticed by many is that,
in America, politicians often pretend to know less than they actually do,
while in East Asia, with its Confucian influence,  politicians often pretend
to know more than they actually do.  Of course, faking to know is not
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what we want, but, at least, faking in the right direction may help the
coming into being of the desirable reality.  We can reveal his lie if a leader
fakes his educational background, thus encouraging other leaders to be-
come truly learned.  But if, in a culture, to have knowledge and experi-
ence is considered hurting political qualifications, no hope is left for im-
provements.
The treatments with other problems of democracy by democratic
thinkers are also endorsed and heartily promoted by Confu-China.  In-
deed, the Confucian education may be more adequate than the demo-
cratic ones because, as I mentioned, the democratic hope lies in a form of
civil friendship, which becomes impossible when the population is large,
while the Confucian education emphasizes on compassion that is targeted
at strangers.
But as I argued in the previous section, these arrangements, even
with the further revisions in Confu-China, are not adequate.  This leads to
the third arrangement of Confu-China that departs from the “internal”
solutions today’s democratic thinkers would endorse.  Firmly asserting
that the service to the people offers legitimacy to a state, but understand-
ing the limit of the aforementioned arrangements to improve people’s
morals and informed-ness, the Confucian would be in favor of a hybrid
regime that introduce and strengthen the role of the competent and moral
“meritocrats”, in addition to the institution of one person one vote.  The
necessity and the superiority of this regime to today’s democracy come
from the aforementioned sixth fact of modern democracy.  That is, as we
will see below, since the meritocrats are not swayed by votes, they might
be on the side of long-term or minority interests when there are conflicts
between short-term and long-term, or majority and minority interests,
and they might maintain stable, long-term policies.
Confucians think that the voting right (right of political participa-
tion) should be based upon (intellectual, moral, and political) compe-
tence, and the sixth fact of modern democratic society means that many
citizens are not capable of making sound judgments on many political
matters.  Through civic education, we hope that these citizens should
willingly stay away from the decision procedure on these political mat-
ters, when they cannot quickly improve his or her competence on these
matters.  At the same time, we should have more institutional arrange-
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ments that help to prevent the incompetent citizens from having too much
a voice in these political matters.  Based upon this consideration, follow-
ing arrangements are made in Confu-China.
First, we should see that a main reason for people not to be in-
formed is that modern states are often way too large.  But on communal
and local (neighborhood and town) matters__for example, which local
policy or which local leader benefits them the most, almost any local
resident knows them better than officials in the distant central govern-
ment.  Since the matters dealt with here are daily affairs most relevant to
residents, it is likely that they are willing to pay attention to them, rather
than staying indifferent.  It is also likely that the private interests of local
residents can be checked by local governments.  Therefore, the precondi-
tions for the sixth fact to hold don't exist in a small community.  This
means that all residents should be allowed to participate in local affairs,
the ways of participation can be electing local officials through one per-
son one vote, or directly voting on important matters.
A difficult problem here is which matters should be considered
local.  For one thing, although some educational matters should be handled
locally, according to Mencius’s philosophy, the central government should
offer a general and obligatory guideline of education.  For another, if
certain national policies are closely affecting local affairs, and the popu-
lace can make sound judgments on them, people should be allowed to
participate, and these matters can be decided by referendum.  A general
problem is that how large (how many people) a community has to be in
order for its complexity not to be beyond the comprehension of its people,
and the answer to this problem will determine the size of “local commu-
nity”.  These questions need to be answered empirically, and cannot be
answered by armchair philosophers.  But a philosopher can offer a gen-
eral principle: how much democratic participation depends upon how
likely the participants are able to make sound decisions that are based
upon public interests.13
Second, when we are dealing with matters beyond those of a small
community, the preconditions for the sixth fact of modern democracy are
met, meaning that it is likely that citizens are indifferent to many of these
matters, and they lack capacity of making sound judgments.  We should
then introduce arrangements to limit the influence of popular will on poli-
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cies.  There are many ways to achieve this restriction.  For example, at
each higher level, each voter has to take a class and participate in discus-
sions, or take a test specially designed for this level before he or she can
be allowed to vote.  Different weights may be given to their votes based
upon their performances in class or in the test, or based upon their educa-
tional levels, social and political roles, and other relevant factors.
Another, perhaps more practical and manageable arrangement is
this.  At a higher level, in addition to the elected branch, there can be
additional branches of the legislature that are used to check the popular
will.  Let’s call the former branch the lower house or the house of people,
and the latter the upper house or the house of the learned and experi-
enced (or “senators” in its original sense, that is, “elders”).14  From the
name of the latter branch, we can see that this branch or these branches
consist of the learned and the experienced (“elders” or “senators”).  Let
me first discuss how the experienced are selected.  Since the local offi-
cials of the most basic level who are directly elected are freed from spe-
cialized jobs and exposed to policy-making on a local level that is often
connected with policies on higher levels, they are then likely to be ca-
pable of participating in higher-level affairs that are beyond the grasp of
the common people.  If they have done good jobs in local affairs, but have
been retired from decision-makings on these affairs, these experienced
officials can then become members of the house of the experienced of a
higher level.  The house of the experienced can also include those who
have done well in areas related to politics and wish to devote themselves
to public affairs, such as industry leaders, scientists, organizers of local
NGO’s (non-governmental organizations, such as environmental groups,
groups for minority affairs, and unions), etc.  From this level up, members
of the houses of the experienced on higher levels may come from the
experienced “elders” who retire from the government on the same level
as the one on which the house of the experienced in question is, or from
the houses of people and of the experienced of one level lower, and they
are selected either through recommendations of some form or internal
elections.  In other words, houses of the experienced of different levels
adopt leveled, internal elections or recommendations.
To be clear, this leveled model is different from a representative
democracy in that the local officials who enter a higher-level government
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are not representatives of local interests in the higher-level government,
but are those who are capable of participating in the policy-making on a
higher level.  However, these officials, even if they are free from special-
ized jobs, may not be free from special interests, especially the immediate
material interests of their constituencies, if they are subjected to frequent
elections by the local people (as is the case in a representative democ-
racy).  This is what often happens in the American congress, and an obvi-
ous example is the various infamous earmarks or pork barrel projects in
which congressmen or congresswomen have the federal money spent on
petty projects in their own districts.  Oftentimes, these projects force the
federal money to be spent not in districts that desperately need it, but in
the districts the politicians from which are best at bargaining and manipu-
lating through material interests and threats.  But for a Confucian, popu-
lar participation is not a way to find consensus of people’s short-term
interests, and politicians should not be the mere mouthpiece of these in-
terests.  To free politicians from the control of special interests is a reason
that the house of the experienced consists of those who are not directly
subject to local popular elections anymore.
The other element of this house or another branch of the legisla-
ture is the learned.  In his recent works, Bell offers the following model.
Central to this model is “a bicameral legislature, with a democratically-
elected lower house and a ‘Confucian’ upper house composed of repre-
sentatives selected on the basis of competitive examinations [later called
the Xianshiyuan]” (Bell 2006, 267).  When there is a conflict between
these two houses,
The “Confucian” solution might be to strengthen the
Xianshiyuan, for example, by means of a constitutional
formula providing supermajorities in the upper house with
the right to override majorities in the lower house.  The
Head of Government and important ministers could be
chosen from the Xianshiyuan. Most significant legislation
would emanate from the Xianshiyuan, with the lower
house serving primarily as a check on its power.  (Bell
2006, 271)
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We can make the following revisions and developments on the
basis of this model.  Governments that are on a level higher than the most
basic level (the government of which is directly elected) can have their
own house of the learned (and the experienced) of the legislature branch.
The learned are those who are first selected by exams to attend “magnet
schools”, and are then selected through further exams.  This is similar to
the situations of keju 科举 in traditional China where the literati obtain
titles of different levels which may lead to different positions in the gov-
ernment by passing exams on corresponding levels.  Some might be sus-
picious of this attempt that apparently revives keju.  But we should see
that the keju system is in many ways similar to the Western civil servant
systems that are widely used today, and the limits of keju often come
from the subjects of the exams and the means to conduct them.  In the
cultivation and selection of the learned, we can take advantage of educa-
tional resources of various levels, and require the potential candidates to
study humanities (including both Chinese and Western classics) and sci-
ences.  Each member of the learned may have a specialty, or we can select
the learned from different fields that are needed for policy-making and
legislation.  Moreover, in order to prevent them from being merely book-
smart, they also have to go through a series of practical trainings and
obtain working experiences, in addition to passing exams.
As we have already seen, traces of the selection of the learned can
be found in the keju system in traditional China, and traces of selecting
the experienced, especially through recommendations, can also be found
in traditional China, especially during the two Han dynasties (206 B.C.-
220 A.D.), in the form of “recommending the filial and the uncorrupt” (ju
xiao lian 举孝廉 ).  In fact, in the Han recommendation system, promising
students were first selected to the imperial college (tai xue 太学 ), those
who did well in studies and exams were then sent to local governments,
and those who did good works in their governmental jobs were eventu-
ally recommended for higher offices.  Thus, this recommendation system
is actually a mixture of the two selection procedures (by experience and
by exams) that were discussed above.  The existence of this mixture tells
us that perhaps some combinations of the two selection procedures may
be more effective.  Generally speaking, the fact that we can find traces of
the selection procedures discussed here in traditional China shows that,
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in spite of our philosophical approach, our designs here are not baseless
contemporary inventions that disregard traditions, but are rooted in the
Chinese political culture and philosophy, in particular, Confucianism (or
the kind of Confucianism that incorporates into itself the Legalist Han Fei
Zi's considerations of institutional designs).  The resonances between our
designs and political mechanisms in China’s past suggest that we may
obtain many insights on how to design the selection procedures by study-
ing various selection procedures in traditional China.15
Whatever the details of the designs of the upper house may be, it
is clear that these arrangements of different branches of the legislature de
facto reduce popular will to the role of consultation, and give more power
to the relatively knowledgeable, experienced, and compassionate.  It is a
government for the people, but not purely by the people; rather, it is only
partly by the people and partly by the competent people.
4. Answers to challenges to the superiority of Confu-China
In the following, I will consider a few objections to the designs of
the upper house.  By answering these objections, I hope to elaborate on
the designs of the upper house and the reasoning behind them.  The first
objection is this.  The introduction of the upper house in such a manner
may breed resentment of the disenfranchised that will threaten the stabil-
ity of a society.16  In comparison, an important function of democracy is
precisely to give people a sense that the legitimacy of the state and the
government lies in the approval by the people, so that people will support
the state and the government full-heartedly.  My answer to this objection
is the following.  First, as is already shown,  it is crucial to the Confucian
version of democracy that people be instilled, through civic education,
with a sense of respect for excellence and acceptance of the rule of the
wise and virtuous so as to willingly abdicate their right to participate
when they consider themselves incompetent.  Chinese peasantry in the
past and many Western__especially American__voters before the age of
populism and cynicism had respect for the authority, and they didn’t find
it unacceptable that the experienced and knowledgeable have more au-
thority.  This fact shows the power of education and culture.  Second, in
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Confu-China, the government bears the responsibility of educating ev-
eryone, and the exams are open to everyone.  This may lessen the feeling
of disenfranchisement and resentment.  Third, legislatures of every level
still have a popularly elected branch.
An objection related to the first objection is that some might ar-
gue that the rule of the wise or paternalism will make the people who are
excluded from politics more and more incompetent, thus artificially per-
petuating the distinction between the ruler and the ruled.  This is perhaps
another reason that those who believe in democracy resist hierarchy and
paternalism.  To understand this objection, let’s take a look at John Stuart
Mill's account on this problem.  He warns the danger of paternalism in his
criticism of the idea that, “if a good despot could be ensured, despotic
monarchy would be the best form of government” (Mill 1958, 36).17  Ac-
cording to Mill, even if this good despot could take care of everything for
the people (which is nearly impossible), his paternalistic actions would
chain up the free agency of his subjects and thus perpetuate their incom-
petence.  This is like the situation where the children tend never to grow
up when the parents are over-competent and try to take care of every-
thing.  In contrast, popular participation offers the best civic education of
the people, leading their vision to go beyond their selves (Mill 1958, 36-
55).  From the discussion of the sixth fact of modern democracy, how-
ever, we should see that Mill’s expectation of the educational function of
popular elections may have been overly optimistic.  On the contrary, only
with popular election, the voting public may retreat to their narrow and
often misguided private interests.
On Mill’s critical note, I should first point out that Rawls offers a
similar argument in his earlier work A Theory of Justice.  He first defends
plural voting (i.e., “persons with greater intelligence and education should
have extra votes,”), an arrangement different from one person one vote
and, interestingly, an idea Rawls traces back to Mill:
The political liberties are indeed subordinate to the other
freedoms that, so to say, define the intrinsic good of the
passengers [in a metaphor, Rawls compares the state with
a ship and people with the passengers].  Admitting these
assumptions, plural voting may be perfectly just.  (Rawls
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1971, 233)
Immediately after making this argument, he criticizes this arrange-
ment, and his criticism is similar to Mill’s criticism of paternalism.  He
states that the participation of all citizens “lays the foundations for civic
friendship and shapes the ethos of political culture” and “enhance[s] the
self-esteem and the sense of political competence of the average citizen”
(Rawls 1971, 234).
In response, we can see that, in Confu-China, popular participa-
tion is still preserved.  It is just that the check by the elite is added to the
decision-making.  More importantly, although Mencius and other classi-
cal Confucians didn’t discuss the civilizing role of mass participation, a
Confucian can nevertheless happily recognize this role.  Moreover, Con-
fucians may even recognize the practical and psychological benefit of
making people feel involved as a member of the state through mass par-
ticipation in the age of democracy.18  As Bell points out, even in today’s
China, “the symbolic ritual of free and fair competitive elections __ even if
the people’s views have minimal impact on actual policies”__has to be
recognized (Bell 2006, 273).  All these considerations give us additional
reasons for Confu-China to preserve popular elections, although, at the
same time, different from Rawls, Confucians may also be concerned with
the possibility that, through this civilizing process, people may grow over-
confident, thus losing respect for the wise and the virtuous.  Moreover, in
Confu-China, exams and experiences are introduced as the basis for vot-
ing rights in the case of certain political matters and for the membership
of certain branches of the legislature, but these exams are open to the
public and the government has the responsibility to offer any means nec-
essary for citizens to be educated and to participate in politics.  Even if
people fail to pass or choose not to take the exams, the door will be
always open when they change their mind or improve their competence.
That is, unlike what is criticized by Mill, this hierarchy is not fixed.  On
the contrary, it encourages upward mobility.  As a famous line of an an-
cient Chinese poem (exaggeratingly) says, “one can be a farm boy in the
morning, but come to the emperor’s court in the evening”
(朝为田舍郎，暮登天子堂 ).  This mobility may also dispel possible resentment
of the disenfranchised against the powerful elite.  When discussing the
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keju system that can be considered a forerunner of the selection mecha-
nism we discuss here, the historian and philosopher Qian Mu (钱穆 ) ar-
gues, it “can fundamentally eradicate the social classes…… [and] can
cultivate people’s interest in politics and strengthen their patriotism” (Qian
1996, 405-406).  We can see here that these arrangements by the Confu-
cians have an intention similar to the popular participation in a demo-
cratic regime.  Clearly, the rule of law has to be enforced so that there is
no perceived unfairness in this mobile hierarchy.
Another sensible objection is that the learned and the experienced
don’t always make good decisions.  This may be a sensible one.  But we
should see that the reason we need the branch of the elite is the recogni-
tion of the sixth fact of modern democracy.  In other words, the introduc-
tion of popular election in history was to prevent few noblemen from
controlling political decision-making process and using public resources
for their own gains, and mass participation was a good check of pure
aristocracy.  But a grave problem of today's democracies is that what was
meant to be a correction of aristocracy has gone to the other extreme,
and it has given too much voice to blind popular will.  Therefore, we need
to reintroduce the good aspect of aristocracy, that is, “aristocracy” in its
original sense, the rule by the excellent (at both knowledge and morality),
and use it to check the excesses of democracy, hoping to achieve a more
desirable middle ground between these two systems, rather than pinning
our hope for good governance on the conscience of members from either
side.  Some might agree with me on this point, but might argue that,
considering the fact that China (or other not-yet-democratic countries) is
not democratic yet, perhaps we should use the promotion of popular elec-
tions as a more effective means to achieve the desirable middle ground of
limited democracy.  But as the path of democratic countries in the recent
past has shown us, oftentimes, we often cannot stop at the desirable middle,
but slide helplessly and hopelessly to the extreme which we wished to use
merely as a corrective.  Even if we put aside this possibly controversial
empirical observation, the democratic promoters should at least be aware
of what the ideal state is.  Besides, even if the branch of the experienced
and learned didn’t directly improve the quality of policy-making, its ex-
istence can be taken as a civic education, thus indirectly improving the
quality of policy-making.  That is, the existence of this branch makes
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people aware of the idea that political participation is not an inborn right,
but is based upon competence and has moral requirements.  Mill and
Rawls are correct to say that political participation offers opportunity of
civic education.  But when participating, common people are also helped
by looking up to the exemplary people and institutions.  They offer role
models for people to participate in politics.  As Confucius says, “Govern-
ing by virtue is like the north polar star, which remains in its place while
all the other stars revolve around it” (2.1 of The Analects; for an English
translation of the Analects, see Lau 2002).  The role of civic education by
the upper house, the house of the experienced and learned in Confu-
China, enriches the educational role of mass participation discussed by
Mill and Rawls.  In short, as long as we don’t hold a radically pessimistic
attitude (an attitude some mystical or Christian thinkers might have) that
denies any positive role of reason and virtues in decision-making, we
should see that the upper house might improve government.
Some might object that, not only do not the elite often make good
decisions, but they often make bad decisions.  Thus they shouldn’t play
the role of check and balance.  The basis for this argument is that the rule
by the elite often falls victim to the interest of the elite class.  This worry
is a sensible one.  To prevent this from happening, we hope that the moral
education of the elite may play some role.  More importantly, some insti-
tutional arrangements should be made.  A key is that we must establish a
respectable and stable rule of law that regulates the elite branch and use
the house of people to check the former branch, so as not to let the elite
establish laws at their own will to benefit themselves or their associates.
Another mechanism to prevent the elite from serving their own interests
is that each branch has to have a significant number of members, so that it
is hard for the elite to form a unified interest group.  Another reason to
suspect that the elite will make bad decisions is this.  The sixth fact of
modern democracy presupposes that the populace in a large state can
easily be misled by interest groups.  But perhaps to mislead a small circle
of elite is practically even easier than misleading millions of people.19  This
might be the case, and I can only give an imperfect answer.  We need
empirical evidence for this claim, and, until we have it, we can at least
hope that the ruling elite who are wiser, more experienced, more virtu-
ous, and with better conditions (time, assistance, etc.) are less susceptible
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to mis-information than the populace.
I believe that the regime of Confu-China is applicable to all states.
The account of it is not only theoretical, but also is meant to be practical.
However, whether the ideal can be actualized depends upon the main-
stream culture of each state.  In the U.S., where most people take one
person one vote as something sacred and any challenge to it simply as
outrageous,20 the regime of Confu-China may only be established through
skillful disguises.  But in emerging democracies and democratizing coun-
tries, the idea of the regime of Confu-China might be spread in its original
form.  Besides, the design of Confu-China might also help the democrati-
zation process of pre-democratic countries.  This is because a problem
with recently democratized countries is that, among them, there are many
populist governments.  The chaos these governments create not only make
their own citizens suffer, but also make people in pre-democratic states
resist democratization.  For example, much of political turmoil in Taiwan
is often taken as a product of a populist government, and the lack of
education and other conditions makes many who desire democracy think
that it is not feasible to the present situations of today’s China.  But the
regime design of Confu-China, especially its limited or restricted form of
democracy, might help us to get around these obstacles.  More impor-
tantly, the previous discussions might help us to see clearly the truly de-
sirable elements of liberal democracy, thus offering guidance to the de-
mocratizing process.  These discussions, simply put, show that liberties
(rights) and the rule of law might be the gem of liberal democracy, while
popular election might be what is problematic.  People often believe that
liberties and the rule of law on the one hand, and popular election on the
other are inseparable from each other, but this view is verified neither
theoretically nor empirically.  If the two parts are separable, a very simple
summary of the above discussions in dealing with democratization is that
liberties and the rule of law should come first, and a limited form of de-
mocracy should come second.
Lastly, I will discuss some objections to the arguments in this sec-
tion that are based upon observations of political reality.  First, one could
argue that what is truly superior in the American regime is its rule of law
and bureaucratic (elite) system, and one person one vote doesn’t really
matter.  Moreover, one person one vote only gives people a sense of
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imagined equality, and this can be seen from the fact of the disproportionally
high number of rich and highly educated people in American congress.  In
other words, although there are no explicit arrangements like those in
Confu-China, the U.S. is a de facto regime ruled by the elite.  I agree on
this evaluation.  But I believe that, even if what popular election gives
people is an imagined equality, it still gives too much power to the popu-
lar will in its influence on politics and the ruling elite.  Therefore, I insist
that elitism or meritocracy should “come out of the closet”, becoming a
proud part of liberal democracy and culture.  Some of the American found-
ing fathers actually had some “elitist” designs, but perhaps because they
were not explicitly made, gradually, these elements have disappeared.
Not to repeat this history, we should make the meritocratic elements ex-
plicit.
The “elitist” design of Confu-China is to give more power to the
politically motivated, compassionate, and competent people, and check
the influence on politics by those who are politically indifferent, narrow-
minded, and incompetent.  Some might ask why we cannot leave it to
“natural selections”.  Those concerned with politics naturally wish to push
for their ideas.  From American political reality, however, this hope might
be overly optimistic, when we see the result of “natural selection” is the
rise of the extreme, the issue voters.  On surface, they are the opposites to
the political indifferent in our discussion of the sixth fact of modern de-
mocracy, but, in reality, they adopt the same kind of attitude of political
indifference and have the same kind of political ignorance as those appar-
ently politically indifferent and ignorant.  For they are concerned with but
one issue, refuse to discuss it with others, and indifferent to or ignorant of
other issues.  They actually offer a supporting example to the sixth fact.
Another challenge that is based upon observations of reality is about the
failure of the Iranian model.  Today’s Iran also tries to combine demo-
cratic election with the rule by the (religious) elite.  Of course, an obvious
answer to this challenge is that the choice of the elite in Iran is based upon
the religious expertise that might be politically irrelevant.  But this an-
swer needs to be scrutinized further.
It should be acknowledged that many observations of democracy
in this chapter are based upon American political reality.  But whether this
reality is peculiarly American or is world-wide can be debated.  In par-
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ticular, we need to refer to political scientists for their theoretical and
empirical studies of whether Western European and Japanese democra-
cies suffer from the problems caused by the sixth fact of democracy.
5. Confu-China: not a rejection, but an improvement of liberal de-
mocracy
Confu-China is a correction of present liberal democratic regimes,
but many who favor democracy may still consider this idea radical.  I will
show in this section that it is really not.  As we see, in practice, a key
difference between Confu-China and a liberal democracy is that the former
indirectly restricts one person one vote and leads to some sort of political
inequality.  But, as has been discussed, is one person one vote so essential
to liberal democracy?  Of course, according to Rawls, reasonable citizens
in a liberal democracy should view one another as free and equal.  But in
his works, there is little mentioning that one person one vote is an expres-
sion of equality.  Only in his discussion of the decent consultation hierar-
chy does Rawls seem to express a belief that one person one vote is an
essential element to liberal democracy (Rawls 1999a, 71).  However, in
the Law of Peoples (LP), he explicitly excludes the “right” to equal politi-
cal participation from the basic human rights, an exclusion criticized by
many.21  This suggests that this right is not as important as what he con-
siders basic rights.  In fact, as we see from his discussion of plural voting
in A Theory of Justice (TJ), he doesn’t seem to think that the violation of
one person one vote is in conflict with liberal democracy, although, as is
mentioned earlier, he defends it (or some form of popular and equal in-
volvement in politics__he doesn’t explicitly say that this involvement is in
the form of one person one vote) on the ground that it encourages civil
friendship, self-respect, and competence (Rawls 1971, 233-234).
In fact, as discussed in the previous sections of this paper, both
Confu-China and Rawls believe that political participation presupposes
proper education and being informed.  Theoretically, the only crucial dif-
ference between them is that the former recognizes the sixth fact of mod-
ern democracy, and offers a more realistic treatment of this fact.  With
regard to the de facto political inequality, if we follow the rationale of
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Rawls’s difference principle in TJ that economic inequality can be ac-
cepted if the least advantaged are benefited (Rawls 1971, 75-83), why
can’t we have a difference principle in politics (I will call it the political
difference principle): political or electoral inequality (in terms of voting
power) can be accepted if the least advantaged are benefited?  Interest-
ingly, after pointing out problems with contemporary democratic societ-
ies and offering the hybrid regime as a solution, the journalist and politi-
cal commentator Kaplan points out,
According to Aristotle, “Whether the few or the many rule
is accidental to oligarchy__the rich are few everywhere,
the poor many”.22  The real difference, he [Aristotle] wrote,
is that “oligarchy is to the advantage of the rich, democ-
racy to the advantage of the poor”.  (Kaplan 1997, 80)
From this he argues that perhaps the hybrid regime he discusses is
real democracy, while modern democracies have degenerated or will soon
degenerate into de facto oligarchies.  Similarly, we can say that perhaps
Confu-China is real democracy.
One may object to this line of reasoning by arguing that the first
principle of justice is the principle of equality, and some of the arrange-
ments in Confu-China violate equality.23  However, according to Rawls,
the first principle reads, “each person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty of others” (Rawls
1971, 60), and the political liberty, one of the basic liberties, means “the
right to vote [but not the right for each vote to be counted equally__my
note] and to be eligible for public office” (ibid., 61).  As we already saw,
in Confu-China, the democratic branch is still preserved, and the selec-
tion for the branch (es) of the experienced and the learned is also open to
the public (though not in the form of direct election).  Indeed, the govern-
ment is responsible for promoting the upward mobility of common citi-
zens to participate in politics and in the activities of the “non-democratic”
branch (es).  Besides, other aspects of equality are well preserved in Confu-
China.  In short, the political difference principle embodied by some ar-
rangements in Confu-China may be in a minor, if any, conflict with Rawls’s
requirement of equality that is expressed in the first principle of justice.
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There is yet another way to see the relation between Confu-China
and the Rawlsian liberal democracy.  If we follow Rawls’s idea that there
is an analogy between what is within a people and what is among differ-
ent peoples, we see that this analogy actually breaks down in Rawls’s
own later philosophy.24  That is, in his theory, domestically, a liberal people
consists of free and equal citizens and its majority is reasonable.  Interna-
tionally, however, he never asserts that well-ordered peoples__the only
peoples that are reasonable__must be the majority.  The well-ordered
peoples actually possess a higher position than other peoples, and thus
Rawls introduces a de-facto hierarchy of peoples on the international level.
In contract, the regime of Confu-China carries out the analogy much more
nicely.  Its domestic hierarchy corresponds to the hierarchy of peoples:
the informed and compassionate play a justifiably larger role in domestic
politics, just as the well-ordered peoples play a justifiably larger role in
international politics.  Of course, the percentage of incompetent citizens
over all the citizens of a state might be higher than the percentage of not
well-ordered societies over the totality of all societies.  Many cosmopoli-
tan liberal thinkers criticize Rawls for not being able to carry over his
approach in TJ that deals with domestic case to the international case,
and argue for a consistent approach to both the domestic case and the
international case that is based upon his handling of the domestic case.25  I
argue for a consistent approach to the opposite direction: to carry his
approach to the international case over to the treatment of the domestic
case.  Then, where do we put Rawls’s liberal people in my “backward”
analogy?  The liberal people and its corresponding international society
of liberal peoples can be taken as a domestic ideal and an international
ideal.
In addition to the above formal comparisons, from a more sub-
stantial perspective, Confu-China actually develops Rawls’s ideas, deals
with problems Rawls doesn’t deal with, and offer more realistic solutions
to the problems with which Rawls is concerned.  As is implied by the third
fact of democratic society (Rawls 1999a, 38), his version of liberal de-
mocracy presupposes that at least a substantial majority of citizens have
to be reasonable, and he doesn’t discuss how to deal with the situation in
which the unreasonable people may constitute the majority or a substan-
tial minority in a society.  He has a good reason to make this presupposi-
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tion.  That is, we have to solve the problem of the stability first in the ideal
situation in which the majority of a society consists of reasonable people
who nevertheless hold conflicting and irreconcilable comprehensive doc-
trines.  Then and only then can we deal with the problem in a more real-
istic situation.26  However, if we accept the fact that no real-world liberal
democracy has a majority of reasonable and informed citizens, then lib-
eral peoples as Rawls understands simply don’t exist.  In contrast, Confu-
China deals with the problem about the relations between reasonable and
informed citizens and unreasonable, uninformed, or indifferent people.
To be clear, my focus is not about Rawls’s failure to offer a proof of the
desirability of liberal democracy, as some people might be concerned with.
On this alleged failure by Rawls, I share Burton Dreben’s view, expressed
in a response he offered to someone who asked a question about the
justification for liberal democracy (Dreben 2003, 328-329).  Rather, my
concern is that, if, due to the sixth fact, this ideal of liberal democracy is
too utopian, can we have a regime that deals with this fact that is never-
theless in line with many of the Rawlsian ideals?  I argue in this paper that
Confu-China might fit the bill.  Moreover, as is pointed out in the previ-
ous section, Confu-China tries to deal with many practical problems, such
as Social Security, international aid, domestic and international human
rights, which Rawls is deeply concerned with (Rawls 1997, 773), and the
difference between Confu-China and Rawls’s ideal liberal democracy is
that the former doesn't believe that these problems can be solved within
the regime of the latter, but needs the corrections of regime adopted by
Confu-China.
If what we argue in this chapter stands, we then show the vitality
of Confucianism in designing an ideal regime.  In other words, Confu-
cianism as a political philosophy still has a broader function than educat-
ing the rulers.  Facing with the challenges of contemporary dominant
political values, Confucianism doesn’t have to retreat to the area of ethics
or some “Confucian reservations”. Confucianism-based Confu-China
doesn’t reject liberal democracy, but is a development of it.  It deals with
the sixth fact of modern democracy which other liberal democratic think-
ers fail to deal with adequately.  In his LP, Rawls calls the regime he
designs a “realistic utopia”.  To establish a realistic utopia is the differ-
ence between a political philosopher and a politician (the former being
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more utopian), and between a political philosopher and a mere dreamer
(the former being more realistic).  But from the point of view of Confu-
China, Rawls fails to deal with some realistic factors which need to be
dealt with even in an ideal design.  Therefore, using Rawls’s terminology,
we can say that Confu-China is a more realistic utopia than Rawls’s de-
sign of liberal democracy.
Endnotes
1This paper is closely based upon Chapter 3 of Bai 2009, especially the
English and revised manuscript of this chapter.  The reader doesn’t have to read
Section 5 if he or she finds this paper too long, for this section is to argue that the
form of meritocracy proposed in this paper is not that radically different from Rawlsian
liberal democracy, a topic not closely associated with this conference.
2From a House of Commons speech in 1947, according to http://
en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Winston_Churchill (accessed on 11/29/2011).
3For some examples, see Kaplan 1997 and Zakaria 1997.  A lot of academic
researches have also been conducted on the relations between democracy and growth,
democracy and corruption, and democracy and ethnic violence (I thank Tianjian Shi
for calling my attention to some of these researches).  For example, the political
scientist Jonathan Krieckhaus has shown that democracy has a negative effect on
economic growth in the 1960s and should have a negative effect in Latin America
(although it has a positive effect on growth in the 1980s and should have a positive
effect in Africa) (2004 and 2006).  Daniel Treisman (2000) shows that the perceived
corruption is influenced by many factors, and whether a country is democratic or not
is only one of them.  Moreover, with regard to the effect of democracy on perceived
corruption, a country has to have been democratic for decades in order for democ-
racy to have a significant but relatively small effect on perceived corruption.  Steven
I. Wilkinson (2005) shows a complicated picture of the relations between democracy
and ethnic violence in India, while Daniel Bell (2006) shows that, oftentimes, de-
mocratization leads to an increase of ethnic violence.
4For a more detailed account, see Ackerman and Fishkin 2005.  There are
also numerous popular accounts of the lack of basic political knowledge among
Americans.  For a recent one, see Kristof 2008.
5See Chan and Chapter 2 of Bai 2009.
6An almost identical passage can be found in Rawls 1999a, 136, and a simi-
lar passage can be found in Rawls 1996, 49.  See also Rawls 1999a, 86-88 and 177-
178.
7See Rawls 1996, xxxix-xliii and 146-150 and Rawls 1999a, 149-150 and
168-169.
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8We should consider, based upon this distinction, whether many “liberals”
in China are liberals in Rawls’s sense or libertarians.
9Jean-Jacques Rousseau agrees with Montesquieu on this issue, and offers
similar arguments.  See his dedication “To The Republic of Geneva” in his Discourse
On the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men (Rousseau 1964, 78-90)
and Chapters 3 and 4, Book 3 of his On the Social Contract (Rousseau 1978, 83-85).
10This impossibility may be a mathematical impossibility: the statistical er-
ror of counting a large number of votes is too significant for one vote difference to be
considered meaningfully determining the outcome.  I thank Qian Jiang for pointing
this out to me.
11Bai 2009, Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter 3.
12Bai 2009, Chapters 2 and 4 and Section 5 of Chapter 3.
13The treatment of local affairs in Confu-China is different from what is
practiced in today’s China in that, first, village (local) elections should be free from
interventions of higher officials; second, on this level, popularly elected government
should be the only executive branch; third, basic liberties and rights should be effec-
tively protected by law; fourth, there are popularly elected elements in governments
and legislatures of higher levels, meaning that elections should not be restricted on
the village or town levels; fifth, certain national issues should be open to referendum.
None of these is satisfactorily done in today’s China. Another challenge to local
elections in China is that village elections in some parts of China have led to the
monopoly and abuse of powers by powerful village clans or strongmen (I thank Zhang
Qingxiong (张庆熊 ) for pointing this out to me).  This fact can challenge the argu-
ments in this paragraph.  I suspect that the rule of law, protection of rights and
liberties, and more democratic elements on every level of the government might
eventually correct these abuses.  But this is something that needs to be treated by
political scientists as well as political philosophers.
14Obviously, in today’s democracies, especially in today’s American context,
these names themselves would likely doom the latter branch to failure, because
“people” is often taken as a good word by the people, while “learned”, “experienced”,
“elders” are words of ridicule.  I use these names because they express the intentions
of these branches, and I will leave it to the politically savvy to come up with better
names for these branches.  Perhaps, for political purposes, we should use “the lower
house” and “the upper house” or simply “the senate” only.
15The late Chinese historian and philosopher Qian Mu 
钱穆 
 offers many
detailed, subtle, and insightful analyses of political arrangements in traditional China.
See, for example, Qian 1996 and 2005.
16I wish to thank Daniel Bell and Qian Jiang for pointing out this problem to
me.
17Mill’s choice of words is rather curious.  The “despotic monarchy” he
refers to is actually what we usually call “benevolent absolutism” or “enlightened
absolutism”, and the despot he talks about is what we usually call a benevolent or
enlightened monarch.  He uses “despotism” and its variants perhaps in order to lead,
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through rhetoric, his readers to feel repelled by this kind of regime.
18Based upon some field works in Indonesia, Benjamin Olken arrives at the
following conclusion: although direct participation doesn’t lead to policies signifi-
cantly different from those adopted without mass participation, yet people in the
former situation feel far more satisfied with these policies (Olken 2008).  One might
dismiss democratic participation as cynical manipulation.  But we shouldn’t ignore
the significance of democratic participation, even if it lies chiefly in psychological
satisfaction.  After all, the goal of a good state is to make people happy, and happi-
ness does not merely come from the satisfaction of material needs.  I wish to thank
Qian Jiang for pointing this out to me.
19I wish to thank Qian Jiang for pointing out this problem to me.
20For example, a most powerful objection to Samuel Alito’s nomination to
the American Supreme Court is a ruling he made that could be interpreted as an
indirect challenge to ONE PERSON ONE VOTE, “a corner stone of American de-
mocracy” (Cohen 2006; see also the New York Times Editorial (New York Times,
2006)).  Interestingly, some, if not all, who defend Alito don’t defend him by criticiz-
ing the idea of one person one vote, but by pointing out that Alito didn’t really chal-
lenge this idea in his ruling (see, for example, http://www.professorbainbridge.com/
2006/01/what_the_ny_tim.html, accessed on March 15, 2006).
21See Nickel 2006 and Buchanan 2002.  For a defense of this exclusion, see
Berstein 2006.
22Kaplan doesn’t offer the source of this quotation.  He may have been para-
phrasing a passage in Aristotle’s Politics (1279b30-1280a5).  In the Politics, Aristotle
also gives many arguments that support hybrid regime (c.f. 1281b25-35).
23I wish to thank Li Shi (李石 ) for pointing this out to me.
24For an argument concerning a different kind of breakdown between the
domestic case discussed in Political Liberalism and the international case discussed
in LP and a more liberal solution of it, see Tan 2006, 88-91.
25See, for example, Pogge 1994 and 2006, Buchanan 2002, and Tan 1998
and 2006.
26In TJ, he offers a similar rationale for dealing with the problem of justice
first and postponing the more pressing problem of injustice (Rawls 1971, 8-9).
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